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Abstract 
 The Washington consensus, the hitherto dominant scheme is being encroached by the 
Beijing model. Many African nations are increasingly embracing this Beijing approach 
because the dominant Western model has failed to deliver on a number of fronts. This is 
increasingly evident because China’s economic diplomacy has been politely and strategically 
coined to achieve just that. A case study is used here to articulate the currents of the survey.  
The paper puts some structure on China’s economic diplomatic strategies and discusses 
lessons for Africa, China and the West. It contributes to existing literature by critically 
engaging on why it is necessary for the West to adjust the conception and definition of the 
Washington Consensus as a complement to the Beijing model. In order to remain relevant in 
the 21
st
 century and beyond, the Washington consensus can incorporate the Moyo (2013) 
conjecture which postulates that, while the Beijing model is optimal in the short-run, the 
Washington Consensus remains the optimal long-term development model because it is more 
inclusive.  
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1. Introduction 
The desire by independent African countries to seek new relationships in the 21
st
 
century with non-Western allies is not a very puzzling development. Resource wars fought by 
white mercenaries, government corruption by Western companies, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment, Cold War manipulations from the West, Apartheid, 
colonialism and slavery: all are a number of factors that are pushing nations of the continent 
towards alternative partners. Against this background, China’s growing economic and 
political influence has become an attractive alternative for African governments (Robinson, 
2009). China’s investments are substantially growing in Africa. It has adopted a strategy that 
is not just nefarious subversion masked by altruism. Chinese policies are guided in principle 
by equitable strategies that the West has failed to devise since the late 19
th
 century: “China 
returns to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the 
cash to play the game dramatically and competitively” (Lyman, 2005).  
Accordingly, the rise of China has recently been subject to  growing interest due to its 
strengthening of South-South relations and its significance for the international system. In 
essence, Africa’s political and economic landscape is increasingly experiencing China’s 
emerging footprint. China’s success in Africa has raised the debate in academic and policy 
making circles about the former’s strategies. Among the subjects for  debate, China’s strategy 
in economic diplomacy has been in the forefront (Asche et al., 2008; Besada et al., 2008; 
Biggeri et al., 2009; Ortmann, 2012; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). This is compounded by the 
fact that, China has an African strategy while most African countries south of the Sahara 
(with the exception of South Africa and Botswana) do not yet have a China strategy to 
balance the asymmetry in economic relations. The present paper aims to examine China’s 
strategies in economic diplomacy before drawing lessons for Africa, China and the West
1
.  
                                                 
1
 ‘Strategy’ as the narrative implies, is a ‘foreign policy strategy’ aimed at balancing an asymmetric trade 
relationship while a ‘China model’ implies the adoption of the Beijing Consensus which prioritizes ‘economic 
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The definition of China’s economic diplomacy is multidimensional and complex. 
While it is defined by Flu (2012) from the Devil’s dictionary as a ‘patriotic art of lying for 
one’s country’, the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI, 2008) conceives it 
‘as the application of a nation’s favorable economic conditions toward particular foreign 
policy objectives’.  In accordance with Flu (2012), diplomacy these days can be largely 
reduced to economic gains in which corporate and national interests converge to a degree that 
both learn the importance of sharing information and working together. Hence, in order to 
compete overseas every rising power needs to flex its muscles and support its domestic 
corporations in foreign nations; by engaging with the governments of those nations to 
ascertain economic security for domestic firms. A substantial part of China’s diplomacy today 
is essentially concerned with economics: natural resources, new markets for its burgeoning 
domestic industries and security in energy. This has led the Chinese to successfully target 
business opportunities at the international level in big and small nations alike.  
Given the controversial interest that China is demonstrating in its economic relations 
with African countries, there are heated debates in academic and policy-making circles about 
Chinese motivations and aims (Taylor, 2006; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). The present 
exposition contributes to the debates and discussions by providing some valuable lessons for 
China, Africa and the West. As far as we have reviewed, the current literature can be 
improved with updated lessons for all three parties concerned in the debates. 
To the best of our knowledge, the growing literature on China-Africa relations which 
we critically engage in the next section leaves space for one principal improvement: what 
lessons can be learnt from China’s economic diplomacy by all parties concerned in the 
growing narratives (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; Schiere & Walkenhorst, 2010; Chemingui & 
Bchir, 2010; Brenton & Walkenhorst, 2010; Sanfilippo, 2010; Schiere,  2010; Wu & Cheng, 
                                                                                                                                                        
rights’ over ‘political rights’. Hence, in the context of this paper, China’s strategy in economic diplomacy is 
different from the Chinese development model.  
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2010; Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009; Wei & Wang, 2009;  Ji, 2010; Wang & Zheng, 2010; 
Fantu  & Cyril, 2010;  Zhu, 2010;  Renard, 2011; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist, 2013;  Wei, 2013; Lin & Farrell, 2013; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013;  Munemo, 2013; 
Zhang et al., 2013; Adekunle & Gitau, 2013).  The highlighted literature is dealt with more 
substantially in the remainder of the paper.  
Accordingly, the plethora of studies which have focused on the move of China into 
Africa have stressed the growing relevance of multi-polar international strategies (Tull, 2006); 
concluded that both pull and push factors are responsible for the move (Biggeri & Sanfilippo 
(2009); established that while the relationship is beneficial in the short-term, more has to be 
engaged by both parties to reduce the asymmetric and exclusive interest of the relationship 
(Fantu & Cyril, 2010); the targeting of African countries with questionable governance 
standards (De Grauwe  et al., 2012; Tull, 2006; Renard, 2011); resource-driven ambitions 
(Kolstad & Wiig , 2011); the good, bad & ugly faces of China (Babatunde, 2013); politics 
behind Sino-African relations (Taylor, 2007); increase in trade openness with China not a 
source of higher standard of living for poor countries on the continent (ELu & Price, 2010)  ; 
diversification of the regional economies to mitigate the unappealing effect of trade openness 
on economic prosperity (Diaw & Lessoua, 2013) and the need for Africa to engage in a more 
substantial manner in directing and shaping the Sino-Africa friendship in order to tackle 
current challenges (Olivier, 2014, p. 15).  
The contribution of this study to existing literature is threefold. First, it critically 
structures China’s economic diplomacy into strands that provide an enlightened perspective of 
the strategies it employs to foster its economic ties with African nations. Second, based on the 
engaged strategies, we discuss lessons for African countries, the West and China that are 
relevant in rendering Sino-African economic relations more sustainable and inclusive. Third, 
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between the narratives, we critically discuss why the Washington Consensus and the Beijing 
model are complementary development strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the 
literature with particular emphasis on China-Africa relations and China’s economic 
diplomacy. Lessons from China’s foreign policy for herself, Africa and the West are engaged 
in Section 3. Section 4 presents an illustrative case study, while Section 5 concludes.   
 
2 China-Africa Relations and China’s Economic Diplomacy 
2.1 China-Africa relations 
There has been a growing stream of the literature focusing on the increasing 
involvement of China and its sisterly Asian countries in Africa (Goldtstein et al., 2006; 
Guerroro & Manji, 2008; Alden et al., 2008; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Kitissou, 2007; 
Carmody, 2008; Naidu, 2008; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013).  In this respect, interesting 
conceptual frameworks have emerged on the effect of fast evolving Asian economies (like 
China and India in Africa) and among others are investment, governance and trade 
mechanisms (Carmody, 2008; Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008).  
China-Africa relations have increasingly been the focus of policy debates because of 
the growing importance of China in the global economy. In essence, the significance of China 
in the international system and the evolving paradigm on the strengthening of South-South 
relations has led to Africa’s politico-economic landscape increasingly experiencing China’s 
burgeoning footprint (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). Indeed, the increasing engagement of 
China with Africa has raised many concerns in circles of development policy (Osei & Mubiru, 
2010). Essentially, many concerns have been raised both in developed and developing nations 
about the burgeoning relationship (Wei & Wang, 2009; Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; Biggeri & 
Sanfilippo, 2009; Zhu, 2010; Fantu  & Cyril, 2010;  Wang & Zheng, 2010; Ji, 2010; Renard, 
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2011; De Grauwe et al., 2012; ; Wei, 2013; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013; Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 
2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Adekunle & Gitau, 2013; Munemo, 2013; Lin & Farrell, 2013).  
Over the years, China has experienced a substantial acceleration of economic 
prosperity coupled with greater openness of its economy. This has led to the country 
becoming an important player in  the world economy. Stylized facts go with the 
approximately one out of every five on earth are living in China and its economy has been 
growing substantially (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006). Consistent with the narrative, trade as a 
percentage of GDP grew by more than 66% for the country between 1990 and 2002. Though 
its portion of global trade and output is still behind in per capita terms  their increase has been 
quite significant nonetheless (World Bank, 2014)
2
. This increasing footprint on the global 
arena has been the focus of much attention in developing countries, including the influence 
China is exerting on Latin American and Asian countries and particularly on African nations 
(Moreira, 2007; Lall et al., 2005; Wei & Wang, 2009; Ortmann, 2012; Wang & Zheng, 2010). 
In essence, beside the boost in Sino-African trade since the 1990s, China has also 
emerged as a source of considerable foreign direct investment (FDI) over the past years (Diaw 
& Lessoua, 2013; Fantu & Cyril, 2010; Jenkins & Edwards, 2006). Whereas Sino-African 
trade experienced a slow-down in the 1990s, it also witnessed a sharp reversal and increased 
substantially from 1998 (Jenkins & Edwards, 2006). Hence, relative to Western industrialized 
nations, Sino-African trade has been increasing at a breath-taking pace (Asche & Schüller, 
2008)
3
. This narrative is broadly in accordance with De Grauwe et al (2012, p. 15) who argue 
that, from approximately below 1percent  in the 1980s, China’s portion of commodity imports 
                                                 
2
 According to the World Bank (2014), with respect to GDP per capita, China does not feature among the Top 
100 countries in terms of the Atlas methodology or Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). More information on 
China’s GDP per capita progress can be found on the following link: http://knoema.fr/sijweyg/gdp-per-capita-
ranking-2013-data-and-charts  
3
 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2006) and China’s Commerce Yearbook (2007), foreign 
trade value increased approximately tenfold to $55.3 billion in 2006 from $5.5 billion in 1998.  
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and exports had risen to about 13 percent and 11 percent  respectively by 2009. This was 
above the share of any independent European nation in terms of trade with Africa.  
The involvement of China in Africa is increasingly the focus of media attention 
(Carmody, 2008). While her engagement with the continent has been embraced with much 
disapproval and fear from Western nations (Mawdsley, 2008), some African scholars have 
expressed positive sentiments as an alternative to the Washington Consensus (Carmody, 
2008). To the best of our knowledge, there are two main dominant discourses. First, there is a 
stream that is of the opinion that, China’s increasing demand for natural resources in the 
continent has led to a twofold consequence: substantial recognition of Africa as an important 
source of the global market’s raw materials and a growing focus on reasons behind the 
continent’s poverty (Asche &  Schüller, 2008).   It could also provide new avenues for 
breaking the stubborn cycle of low per capita incomes (Asongu, 2013a,b; 2014a,b).  Second, 
there has also been a growing feedback from some accounts asserting that China’s increasing 
involvement in the continent is indistinct from those of Western powers which earlier 
regarded it as a good market for cheap manufactures and a supplier of abundant cheap raw 
materials (Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009). This second stream also maintains that China, by 
virtue of its non-interference policy, is increasingly willing to engage with African 
governments that are unwilling to improve their governance standards (De Grauwe et al., 
2012). In fact, the narratives have been presented in terms of schools of thought in recent 
literature. 
According to an argument by Asongu & Aminkeng (2013), the engagement of China 
in Africa has significantly increased over the last decade and today is surrounded by three 
main schools of thought. First, optimists and indifferent people think that, it is a tantalizing 
opportunity, though Africa has little option (Asche &  Schüller, 2008; Akomolafe, 2008; 
Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009; Fantu & Cyril, 2010; Renard, 2011;  Freschi, 2010;  Diaw & 
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Lessoua, 2013). Second, a balanced-development perspective sees the shift in paradigm as an 
alternative to the dominant Washington Consensus that has essentially been based on the 
orthodoxy of institutions fundamentally taking precedence over economic prosperity in 
development (Tull, 2006; Wang & Zheng, 2012; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). Third, there 
is a neocolonial stream consisting of pessimists who view the relationship as unstable and 
very asymmetrical (Clinton, 2011).  
First, the Neocolonialist school is promoted by skeptics of the China model
4
 who are 
predominantly Western nations. They point out that Chinese transactions in FDI, aid and trade 
are not linked to good governance conditions. Hence, its link with the continent is simply 
profit-making and leaves little or no ladder of opportunity for the poor. Therefore, the 
engagements are not always to the benefit of host nations. This is contrary to a Western 
engagement consensus like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
5
 from the USA, 
which goes beyond profit-making by seeking to make Africa a better place through the 
promotion good governance (Clinton, 2011)
6
.  
 Second, the Balanced-Development School sees Sino-African relations as a 
symmetrical development approach (Fantu & Cyril, 2010) provided that Africa can also 
devise a ‘China policy’ to balance existing asymmetric economic relations. For example, 
China’s non-interference foreign policy offers African governments the leverage to assert 
their sovereignty in bilateral relations. Three points are worth elucidating here: (1) China’s aid 
                                                 
4
The Beijing development model favors state regulation and prudence in market openness. It lays emphasis on 
national sovereignty and prudential market reforms (Nijs, 2008). It may also be defined as ‘deemphasized 
democracy, state capitalism and priority in economic rights’, contrary to the Washington Consensus which is 
alternatively defined as ‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights’ (Moyo, 2013). 
Despite some criticisms (Huang, 2010), the Beijing model is being increasingly recognized as more adapted to 
21
st
 development, compared to the Washington Consensus that champions free trade.  
5
 The AGOA offers tangible incentives for African nations to continue pursuing the process of building free 
markets and opening-up their economies. It is also important to note that China has used the AGOA to 
temporarily relocate textile production (Eliassen, 2012).  
6
 This school could be summarised into three main myths surrounding Sino-African relations: the Chinese not 
hiring workers in Africa, China targeting African countries which have abundant natural resource wealth and; 
Chinese companies outpacing other corporations by flouting environmental and social standards (Freschi, 2010; 
De Grauwe et al., 2012).  
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without preconditions substantially steers clear of the Western methods of assistance which 
are used to patronize African states (Tull, 2006)
7. Hence ‘colonialism’ as employed by the 
first school of thought is misplaced in labeling Sino-African relations. The intuition for this 
misplacement rest on the fact that, the use of ‘investment and trade’ as instruments to 
influence the ‘decision making’ processes in African nations by more advanced countries is 
synonymous to some degree of ‘neocolonialism’, (2) Given that China and Africa were 
almost in the same economic troubles in the 1960s, Akomolafe (2008) thinks there is much to 
learn from the former because it preferred to chart its own development course and did not 
follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus administered to the latter. (3) China’s 
foreign policy is consistent with the NEPAD (New Partnership of Africa’s Development) and 
African Union, on the conception of African ownership.  
 The third strand is the Accommodation School. It sustains that even if China has 
ambitions of neocolonialism, African nations have little or no alternatives (De Grauwe et al., 
2012). This is essentially because: (1) Western powers are no ‘less neocolonialists’ and; (2) 
few feasible options exists beside the West and China. In a nutshell, the strand sustains that 
China is playing by the very rules of capitalism set by the West. Moreover, despite being 
good students, there is little evidence that Western prescriptions have developed Africa 
(Bartels et al., 2009).  
 The above three schools of thought which are consistent with our own views have 
been critically used to debunk five main myths surrounding Sino-African relations. These 
include: “China targets aid to African states with abundant natural resources and bad 
government, the Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects, Chinese workers and 
managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to Western advisors, China 
                                                 
7
 While it is difficult to distinguish grants-in aid from interest free loans, the fact that loans are interest-free is 
nevertheless a form of aid. Moreover, China’s aid is not totally without pre-conditions because the recognition of 
Taiwan as a Chinese province is a required from recipients (Gehrold & Tietze, 2011).  
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outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards and there are low 
linkage levels between Chinese and local businesses” (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013, p. 263).  
 
2.2 China’s strategies in economic diplomacy 
As has been said, there has been much discussion of China’s economic engagement 
with Africa. Among them, many studies have tried to comprehend the move of China to the 
continent. This may be part of a non-intervention and multi-polar international strategy (Tull, 
2006). In line with the narrative, debt cancellation, growing investment and the 
aforementioned burgeoning Sino-African trade have benefited African and Chinese elites for 
the most part because they have targeted Chinese strategic interests in oil and other natural 
resources.  
China’s move into Africa could also be wheeled by some strategic interaction among 
three principal mechanisms, which could be construed as push factors, inter alia: trade, 
economic co-operation and FDI. On the other hand, the pull factors include, amongst others: 
market potential and natural resources (Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009). But the connection could 
be mutually beneficial in the short-run. This has led Fantu & Cyril (2010) to propose steps 
that African governments can embark on in order to render the relationship more symmetrical, 
especially through a more informed and stronger negotiation of contracts. Some accounts hold 
that China is willing to deal with countries that have very questionable government standards 
as has been mentioned (De Grauwe et al., 2012). Chinese economic diplomacy is substantially 
influenced by the poor institutional quality in African countries (Renard, 2011); the 
availability of natural resources (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011); more affiliation with countries that 
are facing dire needs for investment infrastructure and a growing need to diversify the 
economies on the continent.   (Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Darley, 2012; Diaw & Lessoua, 
2013).   
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2.2.1 Resource diplomacy (with great emphasis on oil) 
 A number of studies have concluded that Chinese investments in the African continent 
are principally driven by natural resources. For instance, Kolstad & Wiig (2011) have 
assessed FDI in Africa from the Chinese and found it to be heavily determined by the 
availability of natural resources in the host-country. The analysis has further postulated that 
the name of the investment game in the continent is now ‘weak institutions’ because China 
specifically targets resource-wealthy nations with weak institutions. Weak institutions here 
refer to countries with dictatorships for the most part. This is coupled with the fact that Africa 
urgently needs foreign investment (Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012) since the continent accounts 
for approximately only 1 percent of world FDI flows (Asongu, 2012). 
 Consistent with Taylor (2006), while China is looking for a wide  variety of resources, 
it is particularly interested in expanding its oil markets. Accordingly, oil is the principal 
resource motivating Chinese economic diplomacy. Other resources include:  bauxite, copper, 
aluminum, uranium, iron ore and manganese. Hence, the analysis of China’s resource 
diplomacy in this section will lay particular emphasis on the oil-oriented dimension of the 
diplomacy.  Taylor (2006) has argued that the oil diplomacy by the Chinese in Africa aims for 
two principal goals. On the one hand, in the short-term, it seeks to secure supplies of oil for its 
rapidly growing domestic economy. On the other hand, it also wishes for longer term avenues 
with the  ambition of positioning China as a principal player in the world’s international 
market for oil.  
 China has used the historic suspicion by African leaders of Western intentions to 
determine how it engages with the continent. This is the central axis of its oil diplomacy.  
2.2.2 Scale of preference in rights  
 The postulated Chinese policy of non-interference definitely aims to strategically steer 
clear of Western conditionality policies. We discuss these in two main strands, human versus 
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national rights (Taylor, 2006) and political versus economic rights (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 
2014cd; Lalountas et al., 2011). We begin with the latter. 
 First and foremost, China has understood that she was in the same economic situation 
as most African nations in the 1960s. While the chose to their own way, African nations 
requested the support of Bretton Woods Institutions. Today, China’s remarkable success 
reminds African nations of the need to take decisions affecting their development without 
Western interference. The Moyo (2013) and the Lalountas et al. (2011) conjectures have led 
the way. The latter postulates that, at the advent of globalization poor countries are more 
concerned with ‘economic rights’ than with ‘political rights’. The supposition has been 
recently confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014a).  
The former is the Moyo hypothesis which can be summarized in the ‘scale of rights 
preference’ as: ‘short-run economic rights’ and ‘long-term political rights’. While the Chinese 
model can be defined as ‘state capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic 
rights’, the Western model advocates ‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in 
political rights’. According to Moyo, a middle class is needed to demand political rights in a 
sustainable manner and the Chinese model has shown itself to be the most effective at 
delivering an increasing middle-class within a very short spell of time. Hence, once a 
substantial middle class is in place, political rights can sustainably be demanded because the 
middle class would not easily fall into the temptation of crony democracy as with the poor. 
This description is broadly consistent with the view on conflicts over land property rights in 
Africa (Ghana and  Kenya Boone, 2009, 2012) and weak democratic pressures for pro-poor 
agriculture policies (Poulton, 2014). This is essentially because they would have surpassed 
basic needs for food and shelter which the low-income strata is most concerned about.  
The Chinese policy of non-interference is also based on hard choices between ‘human 
rights’ and ‘national rights’.  Consistent with Taylor (2006), there is a deep suspicion by 
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African leaders in frequent Western criticisms of their governance standards, especially the 
constant articulation of liberal democracy and human rights that are fundamentally ‘western-
centric’ norms.  China has been very strategically polite in tapping into this concern. She has 
asserted in no uncertain terms that human rights, such as the ‘right to subsistence’, and 
‘economic rights’ are the fundamental rights developing countries need at the moment. 
According to the narratives, these rights should take precedence over more “idiosyncratic” 
issues of individual or personal rights, advocated by the West.  
An extension of this narrative of non-interference insists that ‘human rights’ should 
not take precedence over ‘national sovereignty’. This implies that sovereign nations do not 
have the right to criticize other nations that are sovereign under international law. In this light, 
the freedom from hegemony and non-meddling in matters of ‘state sovereignty’ have been the 
main themes governing China’s foreign policy. This is consistent with the ‘Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence’ that are the bases of China’s foreign relations8.  
 
2.2.3 Good understanding of the geopolitical outlook  
 Consistent with Taylor (2006), China’s engagement with Africa is also based on a 
geopolitical flavor. While Africa is perceived by the Chinese to be rich in natural resources, 
Beijing’s dealings with Africa are not only restricted to the economic outlook discussed in the 
sections above. Beijing also views Africa as a future instrumental player in global politics. 
This is consistent with the account that, with advancing economic prosperity and some 
positive outlook for political stability, countries on the continent are very likely to have more 
leverage in decision-making at the international level. As highlighted in the preceding section, 
the potentially high African stake in future global decision-making bodies is seen by China as 
a promising trend. This has led to her increasingly asserting that she and the continent share a 
                                                 
8
 The five norms are: non-aggression; peaceful coexistence; equality and mutual benefit; mutual respect for the 
internal affairs of each other and non-interference in each other’s internal matters. 
 
15 
 
common interest and similar or identical views on predominant international matters. 
Accordingly, it has become very common for policy speeches from China to emphasize how 
Sino-African relations are linked by similar experiences, such as shared levels of economic 
development and historic views on Western oppression.  
The ambition of establishing novel rational and just international economic and 
political orders has promoted the Chinese to feature prominently in discussions aimed at 
safeguarding the legitimacy and rights of developing nations. China has also clearly 
articulated that its ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ are in harmony with the Charters 
of the African Union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and United 
Nations. This, in the view of Taylor (2006), has a geopolitical flavor because Beijing is 
seeking to court African countries within an extended framework of world politics.  
 
2.2.4 No high benchmarks: poor governance and elite diplomacy  
 The fact that China does not set high benchmarks in its economic diplomacy with 
Africa has led to poor governance and elite diplomacy.  This issue of poor governance has 
been substantially documented in recent Sino-African literature. Kolstad & Wiig (2011), 
Fantu & Cyril (2010), De Grauwe et al. (2012) and Renard (2011) have consistently argued 
that China is increasingly willing to set the low benchmarks that are characteristics of poor 
governance.  Hence, the ‘Chinese just come-into Africa and do it’. They don’t focus much on 
environmental impact investigations, governance standards and labor rights. This had led to 
some strands of the myths surrounding Sino-African relations postulating that the Chinese are 
succeeding because they are increasingly willing to overlook the absence of transparency, 
especially elite corruption (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). In essence, the narratives also argue 
that there are no ‘rogue states’ in Africa. This substantially steers clear of the Western 
diplomatic approach which has identified many ‘rogue states’ as ‘arcs of extremism’ or ‘axes 
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of evil’ (Taylor, 2006).  On the contrary, much discussion insists that Beijing has a very 
different approach on such issues.  
 Whereas the Sino-African relationship is fundamentally historic, its evolution based 
on the ‘non-interference’ principle with an economic impulse is today widely criticized in 
policy-making and academic circles. While some accounts see ‘state sovereignty’ as being 
used by China in the consolidation of its diplomatic ties, some narratives have also debunked 
this myth by logically arguing that China is playing by the same rules of competitive market 
norms as were set by the West (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013).  However, the scope of this 
analysis is not to take sides in the debate, but to engage what lessons from the discussed 
Chinese economic diplomacy could be drawn for Africa, China and the West.  
 
3. Lessons for Africa, the West and China 
 China’s economic diplomacy has many lessons with the engaging parties and/or third 
parties. Specifically, the lessons to be drawn for African nations are fundamentally different 
from those for the West. Accordingly, while African countries need to critically engage issues 
surrounding the asymmetric economic relationship that is growing by the day (Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2013), the West on its part is increasingly losing steam in relation to its influence 
on African affairs on the one hand and proliferating the Washington Consensus on the other 
hand. It is important to note that, Western foreign policies are heterogeneous. For example, 
consistent with Asongu (2014e, p. 472-473), Western donors have been pursuing multiple 
objectives which have changed over time. The literature maintains that, while Japanese aid 
has been motivated by economic gains, more global welfare gains govern Nordic aid. French 
aid is essentially based on politico-economic goals while assistances from the United States 
and the UK are motivated for the most part by the need to improve democracy and human 
rights.  
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3.1 Lessons for Africa 
 Many studies on the Sino-African nexus are consistent with the appealing dimensions 
of the relationship, among others: China engaging in sectors abandoned by the West during 
the global financial meltdown (Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009), assistance to development and, 
investments in crumbling infrastructure like the building of government offices, dams, 
stadiums and hospitals (Taylor, 2006; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013).  However, these short-
term benefits could be overshadowed by long-run serious setbacks which Africa must start 
taking bold steps to mitigate, amongst others: dangers of resource-oriented growth; issues of 
democracy, governance & human rights and; hampering of efforts by multinational 
organizations to pursue common development policies.  
 
3.1.1 Dangers of resource-oriented growth  
 China’s burgeoning economy and its corresponding demand for African oil have 
substantially contributed to stimulating economic growth in oil-rich African countries. Two 
issues abound here. They are:  (i) the distribution of wealth among the growing African 
population and (ii) avoiding the trap of the Dutch disease. 
 First, on the distribution of wealth, despite some recent figures showing that inequality 
has declined in Africa relative to other regions of the world over the past decades (Fosu, 
2014), there is still great concern about equitable distribution of wealth in most oil-rich 
African countries (Asongu, 2013ab). However, recent evidence on surges in capital flight 
from oil rich nations in Africa are revealing that the income accruing from oil-exports is not 
being evenly distributed (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2014f).  Hence, 
while the Chinese’s offer of low-cost solutions to African development is very welcome, its 
non-interference with how funds generated from her activities on the continent are managed 
could substantially backfire if the fruits of her activities are not evenly distributed among the 
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population. Hence, the unaccounted enrichment of the elite could have adverse consequences 
to both Chinese and domestic economic interests.  
 Second, the Dutch disease that leads to low competiveness of domestic industries due 
in the aftermath of oil discovery could also substantially have adverse consequences on the 
domestic economy in the long-term. Such unappealing effects include among others: negative 
oil price shocks and decline in production. Accordingly, the non-renewable nature of natural 
resources definitely means issues of production decline would occur in the long-term. Hence, 
it is essential for China to join other mainstream voices in warning African nations on the 
dangers of: resource curses, over reliance on a particular export commodity and, dependence 
of economies on the primary sector. Hence, diversifying oil-rich economies with wealth 
accruing from Chinese-related activities would go a long way to benefiting both China and 
domestic economies. Another important element worth noting about the Dutch disease is the 
overvaluation of currencies which immediately has a negative effect on the competitiveness 
of traditional non-oil domestic industries.  
 
3.1.2 Issues of democracy, governance and human rights  
 
 China’s non-interference on issues of democracy, governance and human rights in host 
African countries is very alarming. While issues of institutions like political rights may not be 
so significant when most of the population is in the low-income category, as a middle class 
evolves and begins to demand political rights and more credible institutions, it is relevant for 
Chinese policy to adapt to these changes by shifting towards supporting genuine demands by 
the local population, especially requests that are directly related to Chinese economic 
operations. These include, issues of labour rights for local workers, environmental concerns 
resulting from the activities of Chinese companies and the supply of weapons. 
 The issue of weapons, particularly for governments with questionable democratic 
standards is quite dangerous to Chinese and domestic interests (Jones, 2012). Essentially, it is 
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abundantly clear that the effects of political instability are unappealing to everybody and/or 
economic activity in a given country. Hence, it is important for the Beijing model to critically 
integrate the reality that, political instability and corruption are likely to hamper sustainable 
Sino-African engagements. Above all, it could keep the African continent at the bottom of 
global hierarchy because it would potentially be plagued by dictatorial regimes and abusers of 
human rights.  
 
3.1.3 The Undermining efforts of African and International organisations  
 
 As argued by Taylor (2006), Chinese diplomacy on non-interference could also affect 
efforts by international organisations to administer global consensuses. For instance, the 
NEPAD is a kind of consensus among several African nations on how they wish the continent 
to advance. Values of democracy, good governance, economic development and human rights 
are clearly enshrined in its charter. However, some Chinese non-interference issues hamper 
efforts by bodies like the African Union to enforce the lofty practices and policies of the 
NEPAD. Accordingly, if China’s foreign non-interference policy gives leverage to less 
democratic African governments, this could also indirectly promote corruption and bad 
governance which are not values of the NEPAD.  
 The above point should be adjusted for the fact that foreign policy from Western 
nations has been implemented with some degree of hypocrisy. For instance, the USA’s 
dealings with Saudi Arabia that are oil-oriented for the most part do not attach democratic 
values to the economic relationship (Fitzgerald, 2013).  Another case in point is France, 
whose foreign policy in Africa has not been accompanied by her beloved values of ‘liberty, 
equality and fraternity’ (Charbonneau, 2008).  More recent literature suggests that the French 
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 century foreign policy was failing in 2014. According to Wagner & Cafiero (2014), the 
foreign policy of France in Africa which has been motivated by her demand for African 
minerals and oil has been characterised by French military presence throughout the continent 
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to protect her entrenched business interests and nationals who are there in the hundreds of 
thousands.  
 Above all, while ‘China has an Africa policy’, but for a few countries like Botswana 
and South Africa, ‘Africa does not have a China policy’ and such is recommended by Asongu 
& Aminkeng (2013). It is therefore important for African governments  come together and 
develop mutually beneficial policies based on rational economic arguments in order to 
balance this asymmetric relationship.  
 
3.2 Lessons for the West 
 Today, the West faces a great historic challenge in the Washington Consensus as a 
dominant model of development because the Beijing model has grown to become an 
ineluctable process which can only be neglected at the price of standing on the wrong side of 
economic history. Many African nations are increasingly embracing the Beijing model 
because the dominant Western approach has failed to deliver on a number of fronts in the 
past. This is increasingly evident because China’s economic diplomacy has been politely and 
strategically devised to achieve just that.  In order to remain relevant in the 21
st
 century and 
beyond, the Washington Consensus can find some solace in the Moyo (2013) hypothesis that 
while the Beijing model is optimal in the short-run; the Washington Consensus remains the 
optimal long-term development model because it is a more inclusive.  
 The short-term relevance of the China model has been discussed above on two main 
fronts. First, there is currently a wealth of literature suggesting that poor countries are more 
concerned with economic rights (or the right to food) than with political rights (or the right to 
vote) at the advent to globalization (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014c). Moyo (2013) has 
joined this narrative by carefully emphasizing the difference between the Washington 
Consensus and the Beijing model as issues in a priority of rights, ‘economic rights’ priorities 
for the latter and ‘political rights’ priorities for the former. Second, African colonial history 
21 
 
has resulted in its leadership becoming increasingly averse to Western interference (Taylor, 
2006). This is a fact that has been strategically exploited by China in its economic diplomacy.  
 In the light of Moyo (2013), the West should be consoled that the Beijing model is not 
sustainable in the presence of a middle class demanding political rights. This is essentially 
because the middle-class is hypothetically no longer concerned with basic economic rights to 
food and shelter which are the priorities of the Beijing model. Hence, both the Beijing model 
and the Washington Consensus can cohabit in the short-term and long-run respectively.  
 
3.3 Lessons for China  
 
 Consistent with Taylor (2006), China’s economic diplomacy may come back to haunt 
her in the long-run. In essence, turning a blind eye on less democratic regimes in the continent 
could substantially harm China’s economic relations, especially if corruption and political 
instability are rampant. Ultimately, if ‘regime change’ in poor and weak States may push new 
political leadership to expropriate material and resources owned by Chinese corporations, it is 
an indirect consequence of a foreign policy based on non-interference. Moreover, changes in 
leadership could oblige Chinese firms to comply with certain domestic labour rights and 
environmental standards which could substantially affect the interest of Chinese corporations.   
 The conflict in the Nigerian Delta region has shown how the anger of the local 
population could substantially affect the oil-dimension of Chinese diplomacy if a corrupt 
leadership is indirectly supported (Obi, 2008). This scenario is most feasible if at the end of 
the day, resources from economic prosperity are not evenly distributed. A contradictory 
question that may also arise from the Nigerian Delta situation is ‘the striking of deals with 
local militias by Western governments’. These appeasement processes substantially violate 
the principle of state-sovereignty which China promotes. Now critics of China’s foreign 
policy might as well be willing to find out if, when confronted with such a situation like in the 
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Niger Delta, Chinese corporations would simply move away because their government is 
unprepared to violate its fundamental principles of ‘State sovereignty and non-interference’.  
It is important to note however that the above description is broadly consistent with bombings 
by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), as a sign of warning to 
Chinese companies entering the Niger Delta for oil exploration. The MEND has used a car 
bomb explosion to warn Chinese oil corporations not to venture into the Delta. Moreover, it 
has threatened these foreign Chinese companies that they will be attacked and treated as 
thieves if they do (Obi, 2008).  
 If China does not move towards assessing the myths surrounding its relations with 
Africa, there is a likelihood of backfire in the future. These myths have been interestingly 
documented by Asongu and Aminkeng (2013, p. 263). They include, “China targets aid to 
African states with abundant natural resources and bad governments, the Chinese do not hire 
Africans to work on their projects, Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple 
conditions as compared to Western advisors, China outbids other companies by flouting 
social and environmental standards and, there are low linkage levels between Chinese and 
local businesses”. Though it is the responsibility of African governments to address these 
legends, it is also in the interest of China to help in addressing the myths in a bid to avoid 
potentially negative consequences for its corporations.  
 China’s engagement with non- and/or quasi-states (especially those under international 
sanctions) by virtue of its non-interference policy may represent judicial concerns. 
Accordingly, these states may lack the administrative and legal establishments essential for 
sustainable business activities. Hence, in environments where the emphasis on state-
sovereignty is likely to be short-lived, the State can decay at any point in time. Hence, 
securing natural resources may not be easy for China in the long-term. Moreover, if elites in 
those states have the reputation of ambitiously sacrificing development objectives to remain 
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in power at all costs, the external beneficiary who obviously supports the milieu is not likely 
to succeed in the long-term due to instability.  
 
4. An illustrative case study: Angola   
 
 In this section, we present a case study in order to put some illustrative perspective to 
the arguments engaged in the preceding sections. In essence, the strands of literature 
discussed so far are articulated with the case of Angola in four main streams, notably: (a) 
failure of Western policies, (b) China’s foreign policy aligned with the corresponding failure 
of the West, (c) management policies adopted by the domestic government and (d) updated 
lessons for Africa, China and the West.  
 For the first strand, in the aftermath of the Angolan civil law, the country was 
seriously indebted to creditors in more advanced countries like the Paris Club, Russia, and the 
IMF.  According to the literature, some of these creditors clamored for payment, even 
attempting to seize Angolan government assets abroad. The IMF and the West imposed 
conditions of oil revenue transparency and structural adjustment policies as bases for foreign 
loans. The Angolan government was reluctant to, amongst other things , completely liberalize 
its industries given that it had just come from a civil war and her domestic industries were still 
very weak in the face international competition (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). With this 
refusal, the IMF and the West left the country. 
 In the second stream, China took advantage of the failure by the West, stepped-in and 
flushed Angola with billions of dollars in unconditional loans and aid. China’s engagement 
without strings offered Angola an opportunity to turn her back to the West after what she 
judged as a consistent chain of humiliations. It should be noted that, Angola had committed to 
a host of reforms, among which were the April 2000 program on forty-four benchmarks and 
conditions including trade liberalization. Moreover, during the period 1995-2004, the country 
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had negotiated about four programs with the IMF, but could not stick to them because of war-
related issues.  
 In the third element, to the surprise of many, Angola with investments from China has 
used her burgeoning revenues to pay off her debts to the Paris Club and transparency in the 
country has improved. Accordingly, in the absence of conditionalities from the IMF and 
Western donors, the Ministry of Finance of the Angolan government now publishes a 
complete account of oil expenditures and revenues on its website. Moreover, in addition to the 
Oil Reserve Fund set-up in 2004, the Angolan government in 2012 followed the example of 
Norway in resource management by setting-up a 4.95 billion USD Sovereign Wealth Fund 
that in June 2014 received the last part of its endowment (Jablonski, 2015).  
 In the fourth component, there are obvious lessons for Africa, the West and China. 
First, a lesson for other African countries is that while there is still much corruption in 
Angola, schools, clinics and roads are being built. Most of Chinese loans have been in terms 
of resource-backed infrastructure. Hence, it is up to the Angolan government to tailor the 
relationship such that there are: (i) skill spillovers and transfer of know-how, (ii) employment 
of local staff in the projects and (iii) protection of the local domestic industries against very 
cheap imports from China. Second, Western countries also have a lot to learn from this 
scenario. Prior to their imposition of conditionalities, Western banks had offered loans to the 
Angolan government without such conditions of transparency and liberalization. The 2008 
financial crisis and a new stream of literature on Post-Washington Consensus development 
models (Fofack, 2014), show that it is not in the long-term interest of the West to abandon a 
poor country in time of need on the pretext that she has failed to fully comply with 
Washington Consensus-friendly conditions. Third, China needs to align its Angolan foreign 
policy with the demands of the people. As the country grows richer and a sustainable middle-
class in Angola starts prioritizing political rights, she should have matured her foreign policy 
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to comply with popular political demands and so avoids a Libyan scenario where she might 
lose everything in event of an unprecedented uprising or revolution.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Today, the West faces a considerable historic challenge in the Washington Consensus 
as a dominant approach for development because the Beijing model has grown to become an 
ineluctable process, which can only be neglected at the price of standing on the wrong side of 
economic history. Many African nations are increasingly embracing the Beijing model 
because the historical Western model or Washington Consensus has failed to deliver on a 
number of fronts. This is increasingly evident because China’s economic diplomacy has been 
politely and strategically devised to achieve just that.   
This paper has put some structure on China’s economic diplomatic strategies and 
discussed lessons for Africa, China and the West. It has contributed to existing literature by 
critically outlining the reasons for the West to adjust the conception and definition of the 
Washington Consensus as a complement to the Beijing model. In order to remain relevance in 
the 21
st
 century and beyond, the Washington Consensus can find some solace in the Moyo’s 
(2013) conjecture that, while the Beijing model is optimal in the short-run, the Washington 
Consensus remains the optimal long-term development model because it is more inclusive of 
other development considerations.  
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